The financial crisis which began in the US in the summer of 2007 set in motion a chain of events that would eventually usher in the era of the ‘Great Recession’. By the end of 2010, what had started as a quintessentially financial crisis had turned into a full-fledged ‘sovereign debt crisis’ threatening the very survival of the European Monetary Union (EMU). While the EU member states agreed on the necessity to reform the financial and economic architecture of the EMU, competing narratives emerged to account for the causes of the crisis and informed a heated debate on how the costs of further fiscal and monetary integration should be shared. In the framework of the Horizon 2020 project “The Choice for Europe since Maastricht: Member States' Preferences for Economic and Fiscal Integration”, this paper presents the first results of an empirical investigation on the preferences of Italy, Spain, Greece with regard to the concrete feasibility of different models and scenarios of economic and fiscal integration. The research builds on the comparative political economy literature as well as liberal intergovernmentalism and claims that domestic political, economic and fiscal characteristics explain member states governments’ preferences for different fiscal and economic integration proposals.